"The Supreme Court is Working for Putin!!!!"
by Jacob Dreizin, The Dreizin Report (May 3, 2022)

... [some stuff about the U.S. Supreme Court and pending abortion rulings ...

Izium-Slaviansk front For the last few weeks, the fronts in eastern Kharkov and the northern Donbass have been functionally merging, and now these areas cannot be viewed separately.

As I’ve described previously, Russia’s strategy differs greatly from the rapid-advance, “leave as many enemy behind us as possible” days of late February and early March.

It’s now one of very slow, deliberate grinding down of Ukrainian forces through massed artillery, aerial bombing, ground and sea-based missile attacks, nighttime commando raids, and occasional tank raids against weakened positions.

The Ukrainians bring up forces, they get wasted, they bring up more, get wasted, and slowly Russia (and the Donetsk forces further east) move in.

There is clearly no hurry to advance; the main goal is to wear out the Ukraine’s human resources—and then, ultimately, there will come a breaking point, and everything will take care of itself.

Based on extensive prisoner accounts, today, we may confidently say that the majority, perhaps SIZEABLE majority, of Ukrainian forces deployed to the northern sector—with fighting primarily between Kharkov city and the Russian border, and then Izium southeast to Yampol’—were NOT in uniform as of February.

They are mobilized inactive-reservists, draftees, or (deployed from their home regions, in violation of their contracts) Territorial Defense militia.

What this tells you, is that the regular army has taken very substantial losses (likely including through desertion.)

I previously estimated that casualties in the northern sector since early April have been at least 3:1 in Russia’s favor. I now believe it’s more like 4:1.

It is telling that the Ukraine has failed to document even just one new Russian prisoner in the last few weeks (unless I missed something—but I don’t miss much.)

Many Ukrainian bodies will never be recovered—for example, those hit directly with an Iskander tactical ballistic missile (see below for demonstration purposes only), of which Russia continues to shoot at least several per day, each and every day, at Ukrainian sector command posts and platoon or company-sized strongpoints.